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The Federal Arbitration
Act provides specific
grounds, not including
legal or factual error, for
vacating arbitration
awards. The Supreme
Court is now asked to
determine whether the
parties to an arbitration
agreement may confer
upon a court the power
to vacate or modify 
an arbitration award 
on the ground of legal or
factual error.
A R B I T R A T I O N
May the Parties to an Arbitration Agreement 
Agree that a Court May Modify the 
Award because of Legal or Factual Error?
by Jay E. Grenig
ISSUE
May the parties to an arbitration
agreement provide that a court may
review an arbitration award for legal
or factual error despite the Federal
Arbitration Act’s provision that a
court “must grant an order” con-
firming an award except on speci-
fied grounds that do not include
legal or factual error?
FACTS
Hall Street Associates is the owner
of property in Beaverton, Oregon.
Mattel, Inc., and its predecessors
have leased the property for over 20
years. As a result of a series of
mergers and assignments, Mattel
became the tenant in 1997. The
lease between Mattel and Hall Street
did not contain an agreement to
arbitrate disputes; it preserved both
parties’ right to have all claims aris-
ing under the lease resolved by
court adjudication. 
The parties’ lease required Mattel to
comply with all federal, state, and
local environmental laws and regu-
lations in its use of the leased prop-
erty. The lease required Mattel to
assume liability “for the use of pres-
ence in the Building materials on or
about the Premises of any haz-
ardous waste” and responsibility for
investigation and cleanup of “any
such release or presence or use.”
The lease provided that Mattel
would “indemnify and defend
Landlord” for “all losses, costs, dam-
ages, expenses (including environ-
mental abatement costs[)] or liabili-
ty directly or indirectly resulting or
arising from any such release or
presence or use of hazardous build-
ing materials.” The lease included
an exception to the tenant’s obliga-
tion to indemnify the landlord, “[t]o
the extent Tenant has been in com-
pliance with applicable environmen-
tal laws, … Tenant shall not be held
liable following the expiration of
this Lease term for the following ….
the removal and disposal of any
hazardous waste on the Premises,
the presence of use of which haz-
ardous waste has not been caused
directly or indirectly by the acts of
the tenant.” 
(Continued on Page 82)
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Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
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Alternative Dispute Resolution
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The Oregon Drinking Water Quality
Act required regular testing of the
well water on the leased property
for environmental contaminates.
Mattel and its predecessors did not
test the well water for trichloroeth-
ylene (TCE), a chemical used by a
predecessor of Mattel to degrease
metal parts.
After Hall Street tested the well
water on the property in 1998, Hall
Street discovered the well water
contained levels of TCE significantly
above federal limits. A subsequent
investigation showed that other
types of contaminants were present.
In early 2000, Mattel notified Hall
Street that it intended to terminate
the lease. After spending more than
$1 million on repairs and inspec-
tions, Mattel surrendered the prop-
erty to Hall Street in May 2001.
During this time, Hall Street filed a
complaint in Oregon state court for
a declaratory judgment that Mattel’s
termination of the lease was not
permissible and that the lease oblig-
ated Mattel to indemnify Hall Street
for costs related to environmental
cleanup and third-party lawsuits.
Mattel removed the case to the
United States District Court for the
District of Oregon based on the
diversity of the parties. 
In the district court, the parties con-
ducted a court on one issue in the
case involving Mattel’s termination
of the lease. 145 F.Supp.2d 1211
(D.Or. 2001). After the district court
decided that issue and after an
unsuccessful attempt to settle the
entire case through mediation, the
parties proposed to the district court
that they arbitrate the remaining
issues in the case. The proposed
arbitration agreement allowed either
party to seek district court review of
the arbitral decision for substantial
evidence and errors of law. 
The parties’ arbitration agreement
contained several provisions relating
to the district court’s review of the
arbitration award. First, to facilitate
that review, Paragraph 1 of the arbi-
tration agreement specified the
“arbitrator shall prepare written
findings of fact and conclusions of
law that may be reviewed” by the
district court at the request of
either party. The arbitration agree-
ment also specified the standard of
review of the arbitration award:
The arbitrator shall decide the
matters submitted based upon
the evidence presented and the
applicable law. The arbitrator
shall issue a written decision
which shall state the basis of the
decision and include specific
findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The United States District
Court for the District of Oregon
may enter judgment upon any
award, either by confirming the
award, or by vacating, modifying
or correcting the award. The
Court shall vacate, modify or cor-
rect any award: (i) where the
arbitrator’s findings of facts are
not supported by substantial evi-
dence, or (ii) where the arbitra-
tor’s conclusions of law are 
erroneous.
A provision in the arbitration agree-
ment entitled “Confirmation of
Award by Judgment” conditioned
confirmation of the arbitration
award on the district court’s first
reviewing the arbitration award for
substantial evidence of legal error at
the request of either party. Following
the district court’s approval of the
agreement, the parties proceeded to
arbitration to resolve the remaining
issues in the case.
In January 2002, the arbitrator
issued an award determining that
the lease contained a broad indem-
nification clause requiring Mattel to
“indemnify Hall Street for all activi-
ties with respect to the premises
whether or not they occurred before
the date of the original lease.” The
arbitrator determined the only
exception to Mattel’s obligation to
indemnify Hall Street for all activi-
ties with respect to the premises
was if Mattel (1) complied with all
applicable federal, state, and local
environmental laws; and (2) did not
directly or indirectly contribute to
the presence or use of hazardous
waste on the property. 
The arbitrator found that Mattel and
its predecessor had failed to comply
with the Oregon Drinking Water
Quality Act during the approximate-
ly 18 years they occupied the prop-
erty. However, the arbitrator con-
cluded that Mattel’s failure to com-
ply with the Act was not a violation
of any “applicable environmental
law” because the statute sought to
protect human health and was “not
designed to protect landowners from
having their property protected
from environmental contamina-
tion.” Based on that conclusion, the
arbitrator ruled Mattel was entitled
to the contractual exception to the
broad indemnification requirements
of the lease.
Hall Street then filed a motion with
the district court seeking review of
the arbitrator’s decisions. Hall Street
argued that the arbitrator had com-
mitted legal error in concluding that
Mattel’s violation of the Oregon
Drinking Water Quality Act was not
a violation of an “applicable environ-
mental law.” Granting Hall Street’s
motion to vacate the award, the dis-
trict court held that the arbitrator
had erred in concluding the Oregon
Drinking Water Quality Act was not
an “applicable environmental law.”
The district court said the arbitra-
tor’s conclusion that the Act was not
an applicable environmental statute
“defies logic” and remanded the
matter to the arbitrator.
On remand, the arbitrator entered
an amended decision based on the
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district court’s ruling that the
Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act
qualified as an applicable environ-
mental law. Ruling that no excep-
tions to Mattel’s indemnification
agreement applied, the arbitrator
awarded Hall Street $583.971.60
and also awarded declaratory relief
against Mattel for all future costs
that Hall Street might be required to
pay relating to the environmental
cleanup of the property. 
Both parties then sought review of
the arbitrator’s amended decision.
The district court upheld the arbi-
trator’s amended award, except for a
correction of the arbitrator’s compu-
tation of prejudgment interest. The
judgment against Mattel totaled
$810,107.49 with 6 percent post-
judgment interest. Both sides then
appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Reversing the district court, a three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
declared that, under Kyocera Corp.
v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc), the Federal Arbitration
Act precluded the parties from mod-
ifying the statutory grounds for
vacatur of arbitral awards to autho-
rize judicial review of an arbitration
award for legal error. Also relying on
Kyocera, the court held that evi-
dence the parties intended that the
entire arbitration agreement should
fail in the event that the expanded
standard of review provision failed
was not strong enough to distin-
guish the case from Kyocera. 113
Fed.Appx. 272 (9th Cir. 2004).
According to the Ninth Circuit,
Kyocera compelled it to vacate the
district court’s judgment based on
the arbitration agreement and
returned the case to the district
court. On remand, the district court
was directed to return to the origi-
nal arbitration award (not the sub-
sequent award revised after rever-
sal), and confirm that award unless
the district court determines the
award should be vacated on the
grounds allowable under 9 U.S.C. §
10, or modified or corrected under
the grounds allowable under 9
U.S.C. § 11. 
On remand, the district court again
failed to enforce the arbitration
award—this time finding the award
was “implausible.” On appeal from
that decision, a divided three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit once
again reversed the district court’s
decision holding that implausibility
is not a valid ground for avoiding an
arbitration award under either 
9 U.S.C. § 10 or 11. 196 Fed.Appx.
476 (9th Cir. 2006). Acknowledging
that the arbitrator’s assessment of
the merits in the case contained
possible errors of law, the court held
those errors were not a sufficient
basis for a federal court to overrule
an arbitration award. In addition,
the majority found it cannot be said
that the arbitrator’s decision was
completely irrational. 
The court remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to
enforce the original arbitration
award and declare Mattel the pre-
vailing party. Hall Street sought
review of this decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 127 S.Ct.
2875 (2007).
CASE ANALYSIS
The right or duty to arbitrate nor-
mally arises from an agreement to
arbitrate a future or existing dis-
pute. The arbitration agreement
determines and limits the issues to
be decided. In Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989), the
Supreme Court held that “[j]ust as
[private parties] may limit by con-
tract the issues which they will arbi-
trate, so too may they specify by
contract the rules under which that
arbitration will be conducted.” An
arbitration agreement may include
such matters as the governing sub-
stantive law, the procedure for initi-
ating arbitration, the procedure for
selecting the arbitrator or arbitra-
tors, the place of the arbitration
hearing, and whether the decision
should include the arbitrator’s rea-
sons for the award. 
The Federal Arbitration Act, 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, enumerates limit-
ed grounds on which a federal court
may vacate, modify, or correct an
arbitral award. In addition to these
statutory grounds for vacating an
award, courts have applied the non-
statutory grounds of manifest disre-
gard of the law, conflict with public
policy, complete irrationality, and
failure of the award to draw its
essence from the parties’ underlying
contract. 
It is Hall Street’s position that, at
the time the parties made their pro-
posal to arbitrate, the parties and
the district court were bound by the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997),
vacated sub nom. Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc), petition for cert. dis-
missed, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004). In
LaPine, the Ninth Circuit held that
nothing in the Federal Arbitration
Act precludes parties from agreeing
to deviate from the statutory
grounds for vacatur and agreeing to
allow federal courts to review an
arbitration award for legal error.
Based on LaPine, the district court
approved the parties’ agreement to
arbitrate the remaining issues and
agreed to confirm the arbitration
award only if it was free from legal
error. 
Quoting Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S.
(Continued on Page 84)
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468, 479 (1989), Hall Street argues
that the primary purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act is to ensure
that “private agreements to arbi-
trate are enforced according to 
their terms.” Hall Street asserts that
the Supreme Court has held repeat-
edly that private agreements to arbi-
trate must be rigorously enforced
according to their terms, even if
those terms deviate from the
Federal Arbitration Act’s statutory
provisions.
Mattel responds that the Federal
Arbitration Act’s limited grounds for
vacatur, modification, or correction
of an award reflect a deliberate
choice made by Congress in 1925 to
reject an alternative approach of
certain contemporaneous arbitra-
tion laws in some states, in particu-
lar Illinois, that permitted vacatur of
arbitration awards for legal error.
Mattel says Congress followed the
New York Arbitration Act of 1920,
which had been uniformly interpret-
ed not to permit review of an arbi-
trator’s conclusions of law or find-
ings of fact.
Hall Street points out that that
Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration
Act authorizes “parties in their
agreement” to determine whether
“a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pur-
suant to the arbitration….” It
explains that, by deferring to the
parties’ agreement on whether a
judgment shall be entered, Section
9 necessarily allows parties to speci-
fy in their agreement the circum-
stances under which a judgment
shall not be entered on an arbitra-
tion award. Hall Street notes that
the Supreme Court has recognized
judicially created exceptions to the
statutory grounds for vacating arbi-
tration awards, including manifest
disregard of the law. 
With respect to manifest disregard
of the law as a ground for vacating
an arbitration award, Mattel con-
tends that Court’s reference to that
in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953) was dicta going to the scope
of the statutory grounds in Section
10. Mattel claims that such dicta did
not establish a nonstatutory ground
for vacatur. Mattel also asserts that
Volt Information Systems is inap-
plicable here because it relied on
principles of preemption and looked
to the test of Section 4 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, neither of
which is relevant here according to
Mattel.
Hall Street reasons that an arbitra-
tion agreement entered into in the
middle of an ongoing federal litiga-
tion, which clearly and unmistak-
ably preserves the court’s ability to
correct an arbitrator’s erroneous
legal conclusion, does not offend the
goals and policies of the Federal
Arbitration Act or unduly burden
the federal judiciary. Hall Street
says the parties’ arbitration agree-
ment does not usurp any congres-
sional power or dictate to the court
how to conduct its judicial proceed-
ings. It points out the district court
fully endorsed the parties’ agree-
ment and entered it as an order of
the court. 
Mattel disagrees, asserting that
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act makes the Act applicable to
agreements to “settle” a controversy
“by arbitration.” If the parties to an
arbitration agreement can agree a
court will refuse to confirm an
award if the award contains an error
of law or lacks substantial evidence
supporting facts, Mattel argues that
arbitration becomes only a prelude
to judicial review and there is no
agreement that arbitration will “set-
tle” the controversy. 
Mattel notes the parties can protect
themselves against the risk of an
anomalous decision by an arbitrator
through the use of appellate arbitra-
tion. Appellate arbitration allows
parties to provide for a second
review by arbitrators of an award
under whatever standards the par-
ties wish. According to Mattel, what
parties cannot do is require a court
to apply standards of review and
grounds for judicial vacatur, modifi-
cation, or correction of an arbitra-
tion award that the parties cus-
tomize for their particular cause of
action in court, but which Congress
did not authorize in the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Hall Street stresses that the parties’
agreement did not purport to confer
federal jurisdiction. It points out
that the Federal Arbitration Act is
not a jurisdictional statute and that
any case before a federal district
court under the Federal Arbitration
Act must have an independent juris-
dictional basis.
Mattel responds that, under Hall
Street’s view, a court would be
bound by the grounds drafted by the
parties for confirmation, vacatur,
modification, or correction, rather
than by the grounds stated by
Congress. Mattel asserts that
Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration
Act unequivocally directs that a
court “must grant” an application
for an order forming an arbitration
award unless “the award is vacated,
modified or corrected as prescribed
in sections 10 and 11” of the Act.
Mattel claims that Sections 10 and
11 do not authorize a court to
vacate, modify, or correct an award
based merely on an error of law or
fact. Mattel reasons that Section 9 is
not a default standard subject to the
parties’ alteration. 
SIGNIFICANCE
Given the rapid growth of the use of
arbitration to resolve commercial
and consumer disputes, this case
will have a significant impact on
how arbitration agreements are
drafted and applied. There is a defi-
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nite split among the circuits with
respect to whether the parties may
contract for more expansive judicial
review of arbitration awards. The
Tenth Circuit has agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that the parties do not
have such power. Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th
Cir. 2001). Cf. UHC Mgt. Co. v.
Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d
992 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating it is not
clear that parties have any say in
how a federal court will review an
arbitration award, when Congress
has ordained a specific, self-limiting
procedure for how such review is to
occur).
The Third and Fifth Circuits dis-
agree with the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, holding that parties who
voluntarily agree to arbitration may
provide for more expansive judicial
review of an arbitration award than
that provided in the Federal
Arbitration Act. They emphasize the
purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act is to enforce the terms of pri-
vate arbitration agreements includ-
ing terms specifying the scope of
review of arbitration decisions. See
Roadway Package Systems, Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001);
Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d
993 (5th Cir. 1995).
The Supreme Court has the oppor-
tunity to decide whether parties
may include standard-of-review
clauses in arbitration agreements or
if substantive review of arbitration
awards may only be had under the
narrow standards of the Federal
Arbitration Act. 
It is suggested that a decision per-
mitting parties to include a stan-
dard-of-review clause in arbitration
agreements promotes arbitration by
appealing to parties who otherwise
would be reluctant to arbitrate for
fear of a legally erroneous award
without a chance for meaningful
review. Others disagree, suggesting
that permitting parties to agree on
nonstatutory grounds for judicial
vacatur, modification, or correction
of arbitration awards based on
errors of law would create havoc for
arbitrators and courts, resulting in
arbitration becoming like court pro-
ceedings. Such a decision may force
arbitrators to adopt explicit limits
on the scope of the record, rulings
on evidentiary objections, and for-
mal findings. Some argue that this
would seriously undermine the time
and cost savings arbitration is sup-
posed to yield. 
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